The growing interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa: a new approach or business as usual? by Sen, A et al.
Chapter Nine 
The Growing Interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa: A new approach or 
business as usual? 
Ali Sen, Imad El-Anis and M. Ozan Saray 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the development of relations between Turkey and the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA)1 by investigating commercial and economic inter-state cooperation in 
the last decade and evaluates the economic performance of Turkey in the MENA. This chapter 
first provides a brief review of modern Turkey’s economic relations in a historical perspective. 
Subsequently, it discusses the extent of regional changes in Turkey’s foreign economic policy 
over the past decade, particularly during the AK Party’s rule. Then, in the final section it 
assesses the changing nature of the relationships between Turkey and states in the MENA. It 
argues that Turkey’s interests towards the region are the continuation of a multidimensional 
approach in Turkey’s external relations that started with a 1980 reform program which has 
gained momentum particularly with the AK Party’s “vision” of increasing economic relations 
with the MENA. Over the past decade the AK Party government, with a religious-conservative 
stance, has actively pursued a policy of increasing engagement in the MENA while the aim of 
full membership in the EU is still important. The success of the Turkish economy and its 
emerging private sector with an increasing orientation to the MENA has helped to diversify 
its external relations. Frustration over the accession negotiations with the EU and the 
stagnation of European markets as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 have 
also provided extra impetus to strengthen Turkey’s relations with the MENA. 
 
Turkey’s Economic Relations in Historical Context 
In Turkey, as in most of the other countries of the region, the past  has undoubtedly played a 
significant role in determining its economic policy changes in general and its foreign economic 
relations in particular. Indeed, one also needs to pay attention to the impact of domestic 
political factors and international influence for a better understanding of the structural 
                                                          
1 Here the MENA region includes the following states in addition to Turkey: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen. 
changes in the foreign economic policies of Turkey. The historical background of Turkey’s 
economic relations can be divided into five main phases, namely the liberal era of the 1920s; 
Etatism in 1933-1949; the predominantly liberal policies of the 1950s; the era of inward-
oriented development policies based on the national planning and import-substituting 
industrialization of 1960-1979; and neoliberal outward-oriented development policies of the 
post-1980 period. 
In the early years of the Republic, Turkey had little control over the foreign trade regime 
before 1929 because the Lausanne Treaty, which concluded the war of independence, 
contained some serious restrictions. For instance, Turkey was forced to keep the low Ottoman 
tariffs until 1929. This meant that the government was unable to adopt trade policies in line 
with the needs of domestic enterprises, thereby resulting in an unfavorable trade balance and 
hindering industrial development (Hershlag 1968, 22). Therefore, the first years of the young 
republic could realize relatively little industrialization. 
From the 1920s onwards Turkey’s main European trading partners remained the same 
as during the late Ottoman era, including Germany, France, the UK and Italy. Until the 
beginning of the 1930s, Italy was the most important trade partner among them because of 
the Greek merchants who settled in the port-city of Trieste in Italy (Şahin 2012, 46). Greek 
merchants were engaged in foreign trade before they had to leave Turkey after the Greco-
Turkish War (1919-1922). By contrast, the attitude towards foreign capital was cautious in 
light of the unfavorable experiences during the Ottoman Empire. 
The etatist policies in which the state’s role in finance, industry and foreign trade 
increased was mainly a pragmatic response to earlier disappointments related to previous 
liberal economic policies and the negative effects of the external environment. The impact of 
the Great Depression in particular squeezed the Turkish economy on two fronts. On the one 
hand, general decline in world trade volume decreased the prices of Turkey’s traditional 
agricultural exports. This, in turn, significantly reduced Turkey’s export revenues. On the other 
hand, curtailment of foreign trade cut down traditional agricultural imports. Foreign trade 
policy in this period showed mercantilist features under the mono-party system, and can be 
recognized with the famous slogan in the Republican People’s Party Program in 1935: “Our 
principle in foreign trade and commercial agreements is to buy the products of those who 
buy our products” (Hershlag 1968, 75). However, this kind of mercantilist stance was eclipsed 
with increasing foreign debt during the Second World War.  
1950 marked the transition to multi-party democracy in Turkey. The Democrat Party 
initially was in favor of a more liberal economic order. A greater scope for private enterprise, 
trade liberalization and encouragement of foreign capital were key elements. However, 
foreign trade policies can be divided into three periods. The first, from the election until 1954, 
was a very liberal period. The second period (1954-1958) witnessed an increasingly 
interventionist government policy in the sense of controls over imports and foreign exchange 
when faced with mounting short-term indebtedness and a large current account deficit. The 
third period marked the first major macroeconomic crisis that the Turkish Republic 
experienced after its foundation and entailed liberalizing foreign trade by removing 
quantitative import restrictions as the government had to launch a stabilization program in 
August 1958, Turkey’s first ever encounter with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An 
unfortunate episode was the collapse of the democratic regime. The Democrat Party 
government was overthrown by a group of military leaders in May 1960. 
Law 5583 enacted in 1950 was the first law under the Republic to address the issue of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). It guaranteed profit transfers but under very restrictive 
conditions. In 1954, another law was accepted to attract more FDI – this was titled: the Law 
to Encourage Foreign Capital. Even though the law had a “liberal” stance in practice it was not 
implemented in a liberal manner until 1980, when the 24th January structural reform program 
was launched. Indeed, Turkey did not perform well in terms of FDI inflows in the second half 
of the 1950s.  
In the aftermath of the 1960 military coup, Turkey also entered an era of planned 
economic development, through which a series of five-year development plans were put into 
effect in 1963. Another dimension of this phase was that industrialization in Turkey should be 
achieved as rapidly as possible through import substitution within the context of the five-year 
plans. The foreign trade regime with instruments of import permits, the allocation of foreign 
exchange, quota limits and tariffs was of great importance with respect to the pursuit of 
import substitution industrialization (ISI). Turkey was successful in achieving high rates of 
economic growth under ISI in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Yet, the 
implementation of ISI is intrinsically unsustainable owing to its heavy domestic market bias 
and a fundamental neglect of exports (Onis 1999, 460) and this was apparent in Turkey. 
Indeed, following the completion of the “easy phase” of ISI, Turkey experienced an economic 
crisis. With ISI undermined, the excessive rates of protection and the overvalued exchange 
rates contributed to the failure of Turkey’s industrialization strategy. The oil crisis of 1973-74 
and the U.S. arms embargo followed by the 1974 Cyprus intervention aggravated the ISI 
strategy further. These events led to a heavy foreign exchange bottleneck which was one of 
the most influential factors leading to a switch in the industrialization strategy away from ISI 
to an export-oriented industrialization strategy. 
The period of 1963-1979 marked a significant breakthrough in Turkey’s foreign 
economic relations. Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement with the European Economic 
Community in 1963 in order to initiate an association regime. According to the agreement, 
there were three stages in the way of full integration with the EU, which included preparatory, 
transitional and final stages. In accordance with this regime, in 1970, Turkey was committed 
to reducing the customs duties to zero within a specified period (22 years). 
The 24th January 1980 measures, as a major stabilization and reform program, 
represented a decisive turning point for the Turkish economy. The program in a neo-liberal 
vision was based on the principles a free market economy, which entailed economic 
liberalization and expressed a transformation from an inward-looking development strategy 
into an outward-looking development strategy. Neo-liberal economic reforms have, in 
particular, led to rapid growth in exports for much of the period since 1980. In 1980-1990 
exports rose rapidly, increasing from $2.9 billion to $12.7 billion at an average annual rate of 
17.2%, while imports also grew sharply, increasing from $7.9 billion to $22.3 billion in the 
same period. The share of exports in GDP rose from 3% in 1980 to 24.5% in 1990. The share 
of foreign trade volume in the GNP also rose from 18.6% to 32.4% in the same period (Sen 
1996, 239-240). The share of manufactured exports increased from 36% in 1980 to 76.7% in 
1988. Turkey’s export boom contributed to an economic recovery with GNP growth averaging 
nearly 6% in the period of 1980-1990 in comparison to an average growth rate of 0.5% 
between 1978 and 1980 (ibid., 217). 
The 1990s were the worst decade for the Turkish economy after World War II. A highly 
unstable economic trajectory was accompanied by political instability as the average life of 
governments was less than one and half years. While economic growth showed dramatic 
increased and decreases, the average inflation rate was more than 80% per year. The 1990s 
have been regarded as the lost decade for Turkey in terms of the failure to establish economic 
and political stability – during this decade Turkey had nine coalition governments. Economic 
growth was increasingly sporadic, with sharp rises and falls, including a financial crisis in 1994, 
followed by a severe recession. Inflation raged at more than 80% per year. 
Turkey’s foreign trade, however, gained momentum in the 1990s. In particular, the 
customs union agreement with the EU that was implemented in January 1996 contributed to 
a further surge in Turkey’s trade volume. Owing to the far greater external orientation of the 
economy after the customs union, foreign trade represented an even higher proportion of 
the national income in comparison to the 1980s. As a percentage of GDP, total trade increased 
from 33.7% in 1995 to 41.2% in 2000. The increase in this ratio resulted from the increase in 
both exports and imports. Exports which totaled $21.6 billion in 1995 increased to $27.7 
billion in 2000. Imports which totaled $35.5 billion in 1995 rose to $54.5 billion in 2000 
(Kocyigit and Sen 2007, 64). 
 
Table 9.1. Turkey’s trade by selected export destinations and import resources (1973-2000) 
(%) 
Regions Exports Imports 
1973 1980 1990 2000 1973 1980 1990 2000 
OECD Countries 72.0 57.7  69.9 68.3 77.9 46.7 66.7 69.6 
 The EEC / The EU 46.4 42.7  55.4 52.2 54.8 28.7 44.4 48.9 
  The Other OECD 25.6 15.0  14.5 16.1 23.1 18.1 22.3 20.7 
  USA  9.9  3.4   7.5 11.3  8.9  5.8 10.2  7.2 
Non OECD Countries 28.0 42.7  30.1 31.7 22.1 53.3 33.3 30.4 
 Middle Eastern 
Countries 
12.3 18.9  13.8  8.0  9.9 39.5 12.1  5.7 
 Other Countries 15.7 18.0  16.3 15.7 12.2 11.5 21.2 17.6 
 USSR / Russian Fed. -  5.8   -  2.3 -  2.3 -  7.1 
  Source: Kocyigit and Sen 2007, 66. 
 
As far as foreign trading partners are concerned, Turkey’s international trade has been 
dominated by the OECD countries for decades, within which the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and EU have nearly constituted half of Turkish trade (see Table 9.I). 
Conventionally, another important group in Turkey’s foreign trade has been Middle Eastern 
countries, but the shares of both exports and imports slowed down in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War in 1991. On the individual basis, except with the major countries of the EU (Germany, 
the UK, France and Italy), the shares of Turkish exports and imports with the USA have also 
been important although they declined in terms of the percentage of Turkey’s total trade 
after 2000. Russia’s share in total Turkish imports is evidently striking after the late 1990s 
because of Turkey’s dependence on natural gas (Table 9.I). 
 
The Political Economy of Turkey’s Changing External Economic Relations Under the AKP 
The 1990s in Turkey were characterized by a series of economic crises as a result of chronic 
macroeconomic instability. High inflation, volatile rates of economic growth, enormous levels 
of domestic debt and an increasing current account deficit made the Turkish economy 
extremely fragile and sensitive to domestic and international shocks. Indeed, the Turkish 
economy experienced three crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. The crisis of 2001 was the most 
serious, which caused drastic declines in output, severe unemployment and negative 
distributional effects. However, this crisis also paved the way for a new program, “The 
Transition to a Strong Economy”, establishing the policy and reform framework. Kemal Dervis, 
who was at that time Vice President at the World Bank, was appointed as Minister of State 
responsible for the economy. Under his leadership, the coalition government of 1999-2002 
had to take the necessary steps for fiscal and monetary discipline accompanying structural 
reforms. 
Following the 2001 crisis, the November 2002 general elections represented a major 
turning point and opened a new chapter in the political history of Turkey, after a decade of 
political instability under consecutive coalition governments. The Justice and Development 
Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; hereinafter, the AK Party) which entered the 
Turkish political scene on 14th August 2001, won a sweeping victory in this general election, 
which earned it an absolute majority of the 550 parliamentary seats. The extraordinary 
electoral success of the AK Party continued in three consecutive parliamentary elections in 
2002, 2007 and 2011. Even more importantly, its vote share rose in each election cycle (from 
34%, to 47%, and just under 50% respectively). 
 
Fig. 9.1. The AK Party’s electoral victories in comparative perspective 
 Source: The Supreme Electoral Council, 2014.  
 
Although the origins of the AK Party are based on the half-century-old Islamic National 
Outlook Movement, the founders of the Party have succeeded in transforming the original 
political Islamist party into a conservative democratic party. It is no doubt that the 
conservative-religious character of the AK Party is paramount in its political identity. However, 
the AK Party has aimed to create a political identity in order to embrace different segments 
of Turkish society. Indeed, one of the main reasons for the AK Party’s success has been viewed 
as its capacity to attract the different segments of society, ranging from the religious to the 
conservative, the urban and the liberal. Through this type of cosmopolitism, the AK Party was 
in pursuit of reconciling the new opportunities of globalization with the traditional Islamic and 
national values of Turkey. This political stance has, in turn, enabled it to look both East and 
West at the same time (Kalın 2013, 425; Onis 2006, 229). Therefore, as the next section will 
explore, the vision of reinvigorating Turkey’s role in the MENA as well as other neighboring 
zones under the AK Party is, to a large extent, a continuation of its multilateral policy-making 
approach. 
Turkey’s active and increasing engagement with the MENA in terms of economic 
relations since the beginning of the 2000s can be attributed to the “new foreign policy vision” 
put forward by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who served as a chief adviser and later 
Foreign Minister in subsequent AK Party governments. He played a central role in designing 
the present parameters of the new assertive foreign policy activism. According to him, 
Turkey’s new foreign policy constitutes five principles as follows: “a balance between security 
and democracy”; “a zero problems policy towards Turkey’s neighbors”; “developing relations 
with the neighboring regions and beyond”; “a multi-dimensional foreign policy” and 
“rhythmic diplomacy” (Davutoglu 2008, 79-82). In accordance with these principles, he 
emphasizes the role of economic interdependence, and furthermore argues that “order in the 
Middle East cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of isolated economies” (Davutoglu 2008, 
85). There is no doubt that the expected outcome of increasing interdependence through 
economic and other human interactions is not only to gain new markets for Turkey’s exports 
and business activities but also to achieve a durable peace in the region. As the next section 
will show, increases in the volume of trade, investment and the movement of people between 
the two sides are instrumental in reaching these objectives. 
The successful performance of the Turkish economy over the past decade has been an 
important driving force behind the expansion of Turkey’s relations with the MENA. As can be 
seen from Table 9.2, Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an average of 5% 
between 2003 and 2013, which was the fastest among the OECD countries which grew at an 
average of 1.7%. Turkey’s GDP increased significantly to $822 billion in 2013, up from $231bn 
in 2002 at current prices, making Turkey the 18th largest economy in the world (WB 2015). 
Similarly, its GDP per capita also rose more than threefold, increasing from nearly $3,400 to 
$11,000 for the same time span. Simultaneously, Turkish foreign trade grew more than 
fourfold, rendering Turkey increasingly integrated with the world economy. Price stability has 
been one of the main parts in the economic stability of Turkey during the AK Party period. 
The inflation rate has declined to single digit figures from an average of 80% in the 1990s as 
mentioned above. Turkey managed to keep the unemployment rate between 9% and 10%. 
One would regard this as a significant success given the atmosphere of global economic crisis, 
while many EU countries are afflicted with double digit unemployment rates. Thanks to 
prudent fiscal policies, the AK Party governments have managed to reduce the budget deficit 
to GDP ratio from 12% in 2002 to 1.1% in 2014, which is one of the lowest rates in Europe and 
is also lower than the Maastricht criterion for a budget deficit of 3%. Similarly, public debt to 
GDP ratio fell to 33% in 2014, down from 74% in 2002, which also provides the 60% threshold 
of the Maastricht criterion for public debt stock since 2004. In terms of poverty, economic 
growth in a low inflation environment has had some significant trickle-down effects in Turkey. 
For example, the population living below $4.30 per capita per day as the percentage of total 
population dropped from 30.30% in 2002 to 2.06% in 2013. Undoubtedly, these positive 
developments show that the rising economic strength of the Turkish economy over the past 
decade has enabled the AK Party to diversify its trade and investment linkages in the greater 
MENA with some degree of autonomy as a result of a “new” assertive foreign policy while 
maintaining its engagement with its traditional Western economic partners. 
 
Table 9.2. Overview of Turkey’s economic performance (2002-2013) 
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The development of Turkey’s relations with the EU has also contributed to accelerate 
Turkey’s engagement with the MENA countries. Since the very foundation of the EU, Turkey 
has been eagerly interested in the integration process in Europe and has considered it a way 
of achieving its modernization. Therefore, Turkey applied for associated membership in 1959 
and signed the Ankara Agreement with the EU in 1963. The Ankara Agreement envisaged a 
progressive and gradual model of integration with Turkey through the three phases 
mentioned above (“preparatory”, “transition” and “completion”). At the end of the 
transitional stage, the customs union between Turkey and the EU was put into effect in 1996. 
The customs union still constitutes a unique step for Turkey´s EU integration without attaining 
full membership as opposed to the full membership processes of previous candidates. Turkey 
was officially recognized as a “candidate state” at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, 
which marked a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. Following the steps taken towards 
democracy, and the rule of law and respect for human rights, EU-Turkey relations finally 
reached a historical stage at the Brussels Summit in December 2004 as the European Council 
decided to start the accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. However, the EU has 
exclusively referred to the “open-ended” nature of accession negotiations and implied that 
the results of these negotiations cannot be guaranteed in advance (Arıkan 2006, 3).  
Indeed, this half-hearted attitude reflected Turkey–EU relations during the AK Party era, 
which can be divided into two distinct phases. In the first phase between the end of 2002 and 
the end of 2005, determined and strenuous efforts have been made by the AK Party 
government for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria which involves a set of economic and 
democratization reforms in pursuit of starting the accession negotiations. Yet, in the second 
phase, the AK Party displayed a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment to the efforts to 
join the EU as a full member. Among the problems in the EU process, some of the key 
decisions taken have led to a significant impact with respect to eroding enthusiasm not only 
at the government level, but also among the public at large. The first such decision was 
concerned with the possibility of permanent safeguards on full labor mobility after Turkey’s 
full membership. The second decision was the failure of the EU to fulfil its promises to the 
Turkish Cypriots. The EU’s failure to deal with the Cyprus matter on an equitable basis was 
interpreted as somewhat unfair treatment among some EU members (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009, 
13-15). And finally, the practice of the EU’s Schengen visa policy has long been a source of 
massive complaint and objections in Turkey. Turkish nationals have regarded the Schengen 
visa regime as a practice that puts them at particular disadvantage in relation to their 
European counterparts who enjoy visa-free travel to Turkey. The businessmen and the 
government have argued that this visa regime constituted a form of unfair competition in 
trading between the EU and Turkey and made it much more difficult for Turkish business 
people to promote their goods and expand their markets within the EU (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 
2011, 712-713). Frustrated with these decisions and the practices of the EU and with the 
stagnation of the EU membership process, the AK Party increased efforts to diversify its 
foreign policies in an attempt to strengthen relations with other regions, including the MENA 
(Altunışık and Martin 2011, 578; Hürsoy 2013, 505). 
The process of diversification in Turkey’s external relations was also a continuation of 
the growing strength and diversification of Turkish private business activities (Onis 2014; 
Kutlay 2011; Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011). It is noteworthy in this context that one should 
recognize the differences of two leading business organizations. On the one hand, The Turkish 
Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD, Türk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi) 
founded in 1971 consists of large firms and holdings mostly based in the Marmara region and 
represents the politically western-oriented and the pro-secular economic establishment. On 
the other hand, the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD, 
Müstakil Sanayici ve Is Adamlari Dernegi) founded in 1990 constitutes mainly small-to 
medium-sized businesses in Turkey representing the conservative bourgeoisie, and known as 
Anatolian Tigers. This term refers to cities in Anatolia where a boom has occurred in 
production and capital accumulation led by companies in and around cities such as Bursa, 
Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Denizli, Çorum and Malatya. These are the cities where the public 
has tended to be more conservative and pious, comprising a natural electoral base for the AK 
Party (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011, 714). In addition to these organizations, the foundation of 
the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSCON, Turkiye Isadamlari 
ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu) in 2005 as a private business organization comprising mostly 
small-and medium-sized businesses has also contributed to this diversification process, as 
TUSCON organizes the annual Turkey-Middle East Trade Bridge which brings together 
businessmen in the region of MENA. As the newly emerged Anatolian Tigers under these 
business organizations are located in inland Anatolia and have improved their economic 
internationalization, Turkey has strengthened business ties further with MENA markets. The 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the following stagnation in the European markets also 
rendered the tendency of Anatolian Tigers toward the MENA region to gain additional 
momentum. 
 
The Changing Nature of the Economic Relations of Turkey With the MENA 
In recent years Turkey under the AK Party governments has actively pursued far-ranging 
engagement with MENA countries by encouraging trade and other interactions. In line with 
its assertive and proactive foreign policy, the governments of the AK Party have sought to 
develop state-to-state strategic cooperation and frequent contacts with the countries in the 
region in order to foster greater economic activity. In doing so, they have used a set of 
instruments in stimulating the economic exchanges at the regional level by establishing free 
trade agreements, preferential trade regimes as well as liberalizing visa requirements to 
facilitate the free movement of people. This process was also boosted by the intense efforts 
of the Turkish private sector for diversifying its partners as it tried to avert external demand 
shocks emanating from the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 and the following recession 
in EU countries. Therefore, it has become evident that the MENA region was seen as a way of 
compensating the decline in Turkish exports to European markets. 
 
Fig. 9.2. Turkey’s foreign trade with the MENA (2002-2014) (millions USD)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on TURKSTAT, 2015. 
 
As Table 9.2 and Figure 9.3 suggests, while Turkey’s total trade volume rose more than 
fourfold from $87.6 billion in 2002 to nearly $400 billion in 2014, trade between Turkey and 
the MENA increased more than eightfold in the same period, namely from $7.3 billion to 
$64.2 billion. After Turkey’s exports to the MENA markets reached a historic record at $48 
billion in 2012, it still remained high at $40.8 billion in 2014. Turkish imports from the region 
between 2002 and 2014 also showed an upward trend, except in 2009, from $2.9 billion to 
$23.4 billion. Similarly, the share of MENA countries in Turkey’s total exports, which was 
around 4.4% in 2002, increased considerably to nearly 26% in 2014 (see Figure 9.3). 
 
Fig. 9.3. The MENA’s share in Turkey’s total exports and imports (2002-2014) (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on TURKSTAT 2015. 
 
As Table 9.3 shows, Turkey’s exports predominantly concentrate on two economic 
regions: the EU and the MENA. These two regions account for nearly 70% of Turkey’s total 
exports. It is notable that there is a significant change in the relative market size of Turkey vis-
a-vis these two regions. The EU still plays a leading role despite the significant fall in Turkey’s 
total exports to the region (due to economic crisis in the EU and the dramatic contracting of 
its domestic demand). By contrast, it is clear that the MENA represents a growing market for 
Turkish exports and has become one of the promising destinations for Turkish goods thanks 
to various agreements signed between the two sides, and other factors such as the relatively 
rapid population growth in the MENA, unsatisfied demand and cultural and geographical 
proximity.  
 
Table 9.3. The share of geographic regions in total Turkish exports  
Years MENA EU OTHER 
2002 12.12 56.62 31.26 
2005 16.23 56.30 27.47 
2010 24.59 46.26 29.15 
2014 25.90 43.29 30.81 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on TURKSTAT 2015. 
 
The growing interest of Turkey towards the MENA has other dimensions beyond 
merchandise trade. Non-trade aspects of Turkey’s economic relations with the region involve 
primarily FDI, construction activities, tourism, development assistance and humanitarian aid. 
Bilateral FDI between Turkey and the MENA blossomed after the AK Party came to power. As 
Figure 9.4 shows, the total volume of FDI stock between the two sides rose more than 
twelvefold from $985 million in 2003 to $12.4 billion in 2013.  
 
Fig. 9.4. Turkey’s FDI stock (inflow + outflow) with MENA countries (Millions USD) 
 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT): Statistical Data (EDDS) 2015  
 
Although the greater part of Turkish FDI continues to flow to EU countries, Turkish 
investments in the MENA have notably increased from $100 million in 2002 to $871 million 
in 2013. In this context, FDI inflows from MENA countries to Turkey showed a dramatic 
increase during the same period, reaching a record level of $15.3 billion in 2010, up from $338 
million in 2002, and maintained a level of annual FDI inflows above $10 billion in the following 
three years (2011-2013) (see Table 9.4).  
 
Table 9.4. Turkey’s FDI stock with MENA countries (2002-2013) (Millions USD) 
Years FDI Inflow FDI Outflow Total 
2000 392 57 449 
2002 338 100 438 
2003 877 108 985 
2004 625 114 739 
2005 4.336 130 4.466 
2006 7.213 138 7.351 
2007 10.290 230 10.520 
2008 7.244 332 7.576 
2009 10.962 623 11.585 
2010 15.390 242 15.632 
2011 10.830 477 11.307 
2012 14.409 883 15.292 
2013 11.557 871 12.428 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT): Statistical Data (EVDS) 2015 
 
Turkish outflow FDI ranged from small bakeries and restaurants set up by individuals to large 
Turkish multinational enterprises (MNE). According to a survey published in 2014, in 2012 53 
affiliates of the largest 28 Turkish MNEs in the MENA operated in a wide range of fields 
including infrastructure, oil and gas related investments, energy, fertilizer, food and beverage, 
glass, textile and consumer products (DEIK 2014, 15-25). 
Construction and contracting industry is one of the major parts of Turkish outward FDI. 
Turkish companies realized nearly 7500 construction projects in 103 countries in the world 
between 1972 and 2014 (Muteahhitler Birligi 2014, 13). The total volume of work undertaken 
by Turkish contractors has reached approximately $285 billion. The total cost of the projects 
realized in the MENA also climbed to $119.4 billion by the first half of 2014, accounting for 
nearly 42% of the total cost of Turkish construction projects worldwide (see Table 9.5). In the 
period 2010-2013 projects in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran and Qatar represented 32% of 
total contract value of total foreign Turkish construction activities (ibid. 7). However, Turkish 
companies still have major projects in almost all countries in the MENA which includes the 
building of highways, airports, bridges, tunnels as well as hotels, shopping centers and 
housing and sports complexes. 
 
Table 9.5. Construction projects of Turkish firms in MENA countries and share to total (1972-
2014 (first 6 months)) 
Country Number of Projects Total Project Costs ($) Share (%) 
Libya 565 28819029791 10.13 
Iraq 853 20855749588 7.33 
Qatar 117 15085321033 5.30 
Saudi Arabia 212 13523285914 4.75 
Algeria 231 9830917444 3.45 
UAE 104 9126399009 3.21 
Oman 41 5590691316 1.97 
Iran 45 4077133087 1.43 
Morocco 48 3339491196 1.17 
Jordan 38 2298803862 0.81 
Yemen 15 1565399965 0.55 
Kuwait 24 1400037504 0.49 
Israel 157 1226253549 0.43 
Egypt 26 981782857 0.35 
Tunisia 11 772959772 0.27 
Lebanon 10 364979157 0.13 
Bahrain 4 284752200 0.10 
Syria 24 258415791 0.09 
Palestine 1 35000000 0.01 
Total 2526 119436403035 41,97 
Source: Türk Muteahhitler Birligi 2014. 
 
The growing activism of Turkish external policies has also been observed in its increasing 
role in development aid in the MENA and especially in neighboring countries. Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from Turkey has remarkably grown over the past decade. It 
rose to $2.5 billion in 2012 from $200 million in 2002, almost doubling between 2011 and 
2012. In 2013 Turkey was the third largest humanitarian donor country among G20 states, 
with $1.6 billion given in foreign aid, and the most generous country in terms of share of GNI 
(0.21%). It is clear that a large proportion of humanitarian assistance from Turkey was, in 
particular, associated with the escalating Syrian crisis on its southern border, and housing 
refugees within Turkey constitutes an important part of this aid (GHA 2013, 36; GHA 2014, 
27-30).  
Another dimension of Turkey’s increasing interaction with the MENA is the growth in 
the contact and engagement between peoples and cultures. The increase in the movement 
of people over the past decade has been boosted by the consciously liberal visa policy of the 
AK Party in order to ease restrictions on travel. The visas were mutually removed between 
Turkey and nine countries in the MENA (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2015).The removal of visa barriers has led to ever-larger numbers of people from the MENA 
travelling to Turkey. As Figure 9.5 shows, the number of tourists from MENA countries 
travelling to Turkey rose to nearly 4.7 million in 2013, up from 1.1 million in 2002.  
 
Fig. 9.5. Visitors arriving in Turkey from MENA countries (2002-2013) 
 
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism General Directorate of Investment 
and Enterprises 2013. 
 
The connections between Turkey and other MENA countries stemming from this 
movement of people can be best observed by the expansion of Turkish Airlines (THY) flights 
in the region. By September 2014 THY flew to 260 destinations worldwide, 44 of which are in 
the MENA (THY 2015). Additionally, Turkish TV soap operas have been broadcast on prime-
time Arabic TV and have gained widespread popularity in the regopn which in turn has not 
only helped to increase Arab tourism activities in Turkey but also to eliminate psychological 
and cultural barriers between peoples in the region (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011, 709).  
Although many points made so far suggest that ever-increasing interaction between 
Turkey and the MENA is likely to continue in the longer-term, both regional and domestic 
challenges that would qualify Turkey’s performance in the region need to be considered. On 
the regional side, the impact of the Arab uprisings is significantly important regarding the 
performance of the bilateral relations of Turkey in the region. As Tables 9.4 and 9.5 indicate, 
overall trade and investment between Turkey and the countries most affected by the Arab 
Spring, especially Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, did not actually suffer greatly apart from a 
few exceptions such as the loss in trade volume with Syria in 2012, and with Libya in 2011. 
Interestingly enough, even Turkey’s trade with Syria during the civil war there recovered 
slowly in 2013 and almost reached pre-war levels in 2014. In achieving this, the efforts of 
Syrian businessmen who have fled their country to escape the civil war and who reside mainly 
in eastern cities in Turkey close to the Turkish-Syrian border have been especially effective. 
They have revitalized trade with Syria through the companies they have set up in Turkey. 
However, it should be noted that the expectations related to Turkey’s foreign trade with Syria 
before the war was so high that it was hoped that annual bilateral trade with Syria would have 
reached $5 billion (Sonmez 2014). Similar observations can also be made more strikingly for 
Turkish investment in Libya. As Table 9.5 indicates, the level of Turkish investment projects in 
Libya reached $175 million in 2011 and $176 million in 2012, but in 2013 and 2014 the 
expansion of Turkish FDI in Libya, especially in the construction sector, came almost to a halt 
at $7 million and $8 million respectively. The significant decline of Turkish investments in 
Libya was, therefore, the biggest loss for Turkey’s bilateral economic relations experienced in 
the region following the Arab uprisings. Consequently, on the whole, it can be said that the 
loss in Turkey’s bilateral economic relations with the countries of the Arab uprisings is the 
greatest challenge for the medium-term, if not long-term. 
On the domestic side, several major and interrelated constraints–the current account 
deficit, extensive energy dependence, and a low savings rate–faced by the Turkish economy 
comprise the domestic challenges for the maintenance of Turkey’s economic performance in 
the MENA. As Table 9.2 indicates, the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP was, in 
particular, high between 2010 and 2013, registering 6% in 2012 and 9.7% in 2011. The main 
reason for this current account deficit is the large foreign trade deficit. As with the foreign 
trade deficit, annual energy imports (nearly $60 billion) are blamed for the high current 
account deficit (Edgerley 2013).  
An analytical macroeconomic history of the Turkish economy since the Second World 
War underlines quite convincingly that economic crises follow the same pattern: high 
economic growth aggravates the current account deficit, and a sudden interruption of capital 
inflows together with other structural problems triggers economic crises (Onis 2013, 1416). 
The underlining causes of Turkey’s current account deficits present two important factors, 
namely exceptionally low saving rates and extensive energy-import dependence. On the one 
hand, as savings fall short of investments, Turkey needs foreign capital to finance its current 
account deficit. On the other hand, Turkey’s current account balance is highly sensitive to 
changes in energy prices because it must import almost all of its energy needs. The country's 
dependence on foreign energy continues to increase in parallel with its fast economic growth. 
Hence, high degrees of energy dependence and low savings rates constitute the major 
structural root causes of Turkey’s chronic account deficit. These constraints, in turn, might 
limit the expansion and the sustainability of Turkey’s external relations towards the MENA. 
 
Conclusion 
Turkey is becoming increasingly interested in the MENA, emerging as a regional economic 
power thanks to its successful economic performance. Although Turkey’s multidimensional 
approach to its external relations began with a reform program in 1980, the pace of policy 
reform increased following the AK Party’s rise to power in November 2002. The AK Party’s 
foreign policy activism under Davutoglu’s “new foreign policy vision” especially 
complemented the “vision” of increasing economic relations with the MENA. Over the past 
decade the AK Party government, with a religious-conservative stance, has actively pursued 
a policy of increasing engagement in the MENA while the aim of full membership in the EU 
remains important. The political stability Turkey has enjoyed since 2002 has underpinned its 
impressive economic performance. The success of the Turkish economy and its emerging 
private sector with an increasing orientation to the MENA has helped to diversify the external 
relations of Turkey. Frustration over the accession negotiations with the EU and the 
stagnation of European markets as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 provided 
extra impetus to strengthen Turkey’s relations with the MENA. 
MENA countries over the past decade have represented a growing market for Turkish 
exports and have become some of the most promising destinations thanks to the facilities 
offered by the recently established liberal bilateral agreements. The growing interest of 
Turkey towards the MENA has also been reinforced by other dimensions beyond merchandise 
trade such as FDI, construction activities, tourism, development assistance and humanitarian 
aid. Turkey under the AK Party has set out a 2023 vision which has ambitious goals. 
Accordingly, the government’s main objective is to make Turkey a top ten economy in the 
world by the centenary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. To do this, the government 
plans to increase GDP to $2 trillion and GDP per capita to $25,000 by 2023. Furthermore, the 
government aims to develop a $500 billion export sector and to increase the total number of 
exporters to 100,000 companies (mfa.gov.tr). 
In accomplishing these objectives, Turkey must address its overdependence on foreign 
energy and low levels of domestic savings not only to overcome its long-standing current 
account deficit but also to come to terms with current and future challenges presented by the 
Arab uprisings. In the long term, there is no doubt that Turkey seeks to promote a peaceful, 
stable, prosperous and more democratic environment for the countries of the Arab uprisings, 
in particular, and the MENA as a whole. Such developments in this direction would mean a 
win-win outcome for all the parties in the region. 
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